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TREADING ON SACRED GROUND: CONGRESS'S POWER
TO SUBJECT WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS TO SENATE
CONFIRMATION
The late Senator Sam Ervin, a Shakespeare-quoting country
lawyer who chaired the committee that investigated the Water-
gate coverup, was wary of powerful Washington figures who
conducted their business "on the windy side of the law."' The
lawmaker thus found it "simply ironic" that, in 1973, the Senate
required confirmation for second lieutenants in the United
States Army but not for the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), a White House appointee Ervin
claimed wielded powers "second only to ... the President."'
Like many of his colleagues, the North Carolina senator be-
lieved that the Nixon Administration had abused its executive
authority, particularly in budget matters.' The Washington Post
agreed and, in an editorial, called for an end to OMB's
"'advisory' group immunity."4 Congressional concern crystallized
in a bill requiring Senate confirmation for the office's director
and deputy director.5 President Nixon vetoed the bill,6 but, in
1974, Congress passed a nearly identical bill.' In the midst of
1. William M. LeoGrande, Contras Have Probably Lost Congress, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
2, 1986, at 115 (quoting Sen. Sam Ervin); see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH
NIGHT act 3, sc. 4, 1. 154 (Alfred Harbage ed., Penguin Books 1969) (Fabian: "Still
you keep o' th' windy side of the law.").
2. 119 CONG. REc. 3185 (1973).
3. Id. at 3185-86. The chairman of the Department of Agriculture Appropriations
Subcommittee stated that President Nixon's unilateral action in zero-budgeting agri-
cultural loan programs "does violence to our legislative-executive processes." Id. at
3186.
4. Acknowledging the Status of OMB, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1973, at A20.
5. S. 518, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Confirmation of the Director
and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget: Hearings Before the
House Legislation and Military Operations Subcomm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973)
[hereinafter OMB Hearings].
6. President's Message to the Senate Vetoing Bill Requiring Senate Confirmation
of the Two Positions, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 681 (May 18, 1973) [hereinafter
Nixon Veto Message].
7. Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, § 1, 88 Stat. 11 (codified at 31
U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b) (1988)).
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the worst crisis of his administration-the Watergate cover-
up-President Nixon signed the bill into law.'
Before being overwhelmed by Watergate, the Nixon Adminis-
tration had viewed Congress's action as a serious threat to exec-
utive authority. In his 1973 veto message, Nixon said that the
doctrine of separation of powers, as well as policy concerns of
control over the executive staff, required the President to retain
complete discretion over hiring and firing those who served him
in the White House Office (WHO). A few months earlier, a
member of Nixon's Justice Department had stated in testimony
before Congress that failure to afford the President complete
discretion in choosing and dismissing his domestic and foreign
affairs advisers-his "inner circle"-threatened "the integrity of
the executive as a coequal branch of the Government."10 A few
years later, President Jimmy Carter used a similar argument to
successfully oppose bills" that would have required the Senate
to confirm the President's nominees for the National Security
Adviser (NSA) and his deputy. 2
Nixon's and Carter's stances were rare examples of chief exec-
utives energetically opposing congressional incursions into the
President's traditional prerogative to select his own staff.3 Cur-
8. On the day the law was enacted, a federal grand jury indicted seven men, all
former members of the Nixon Administration or the President's 1972 reelection cam-
paign, on charges of conspiracy. In addition, six were charged with obstruction of
justice, two were charged with perjury, and three were charged with making false
statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the grand jury, or both. Anthony
Ripley, Federal Grand Jury Indicts 7 Nixon Aides on Charges of Conspiracy on Wa-
tergate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1974, at Al.
9. Nixon Veto Message, supra note 6, at 681.
10. OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 107.
11. S. 586, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see H.R. 11,786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); H.R. 10,745, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
12. See Letter from President Carter to Representative Frank Church, Chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 4, 1979) [hereinafter Carter Letter], re-
printed in The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1980) [hereinafter NSA Hear-
ing]. Carter claimed that the proposal encroached on the President's traditional au-
thority to select those officials who are a "direct extension of the Presidency." Id. at
130.
13. See Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETERED PRESIDENCY ix, ix (L. Gordon
Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (claiming that recent presidents have al-
lowed Congress "to establish easements across the constitutional powers of the presi-
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rently, only a fraction of more than 4500 political positions are
made by the President without the requirement of Senate confir-
mation. 4 Those few positions, however, are critical to the oper-
ation of the executive branch 5 and generate a disproportionate
amount of attention from critics in Congress who seek to control
the executive branch through "the first weapon in the armory of
congressional oversight.""
The executive branch operates with the constant potential for
disruption. In April 1995, for example, a group of Republican
lawmakers, irritated by a National Security Council (NSC) staff
member's work to ease trade sanctions on Cuba, proposed legis-
lation to make the NSA and various top aides subject to Senate
confirmation.' In addition, federal lawmakers periodically in-
troduce low-profile bills to require confirmation of existing mem-
bers of the executive hierarchy. 8 Recently, with Republican
dency"); TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE ExEcuTIVE 141 (1992) ("[I]n approving
presidential nominees, the Senate has often expressed and even imposed its views
upon the President as to how it wants something done.").
14. ROGELIo GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 92-820, POLITICAL APPOINTEE
POSITIONS: TYPE AND Nu/MBER (1995). The Congressional Research Service (CRS) re-
port claims that only twenty-five positions are appointed by the President without
confirmation by the Senate. Id. That number apparently does not include numerous
political appointees who hold the title of "Assistant to the President." See OFFICE OF
THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1993-94, at 94 (1993) [hereinafter THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT MANUAL 1993-94]. All totalled, more than 400 advisers and staff work in
the White House Office. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropri-
ations for Fiscal Year 1993: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (1992) (statement of Paul W. Bateman,
Deputy Assistant to the President for Management).
15. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, THE STATE OF THE PRESIDENCY 244-45 (2d ed. 1980)
(attributing the growth of the President's staff to "the belief that critical societal
problems require that wise men be assigned to the White House to alert the presi-
dent to appropriate solutions and to serve as the agents for implementing these
solutions"); JOHN A. MALTESE, SPIN CONTROL 108 (2d ed. 1994) (describing Nixon's
White House operational staff as making "a White House-centered system of govern-
ment possible").
16. JOHN HART, THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 140 (1987).
17. See John McCaslin, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at AS.
18. See, e.g., H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (requiring confirmation for the
head of OMB's Office of Administration and Regulatory Affairs); H.R. 4000, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (requiring confirmation for the United States Postal Service
Inspector General); S. 373, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring that the Register
of Copyright be subject to senatorial approval); H.R. 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
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majorities in both houses of Congress and an ongoing investiga-
tion into Whitewater by an independent prosecutor, 9 the pro-
file of top White House officials has been raised a notch above
even the usual frenetic scrutiny.20 For example, following the
1994 resignation of former White House Counsel Bernard
Nussbaum over his contacts with federal officials investigating a
failed Arkansas savings and loan,2 a political commentator
recommended that Nussbaum's successor push to abolish the
Counsel's position.22 The editorial could have applied the same
arguments in calling for Congress to rein in the WHO by requir-
ing the President to submit future appointees to the Senate for
confirmation.2
(1993) (requiring that the Register of Copyright be subject to senatorial approval). In
addition, fear of growing power at the White House prompted lawmakers in 1991 to
introduce a bill that would have mandated sweeping disclosure requirements for
presidential advisers engaged in the "evaluation . . . or coordination of agency
rulemaking." S. 1942, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1991). In a report accompanying
the bill, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee said that the history of regula-
tory review centers on an "increasingly systematic effort to shape regulatory policy
at the presidential level." S. REP. No. 256, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992). The mea-
sure would have included virtually any official serving in the White House or Execu-
tive Office of the President, a requirement that would have been "unprecedented in
scope and intrusiveness." Letter from Frank Hodsoll, Deputy Director for Manage-
ment, to Senator William Rth (Feb. 25, 1992), reprinted in id. at 54.
19. Susan Schmidt, Whitewater Counsel Probes Question of Foster Documents Re-
moval, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1995, at A3.
20. See Toni Locy, Probe of Clinton Aide Sought in Travel Case, WASH. POST, Feb.
14, 1996, at A12 (reporting that David Watkins, the former director of White House
administration, felt "enormous pressure" in 1993 from First Lady Hillary Clinton,
then-Chief of Staff Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty, and former Deputy White House
Counsel Vincent Foster to fire employees of the White House travel office); Susan
Schmidt, White House Aide, D'Amato Spar Over Testimony on Whitewater Discus-
sions, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at A6 (reporting that Senator Alfonse D'Amato,
the Republican chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, accused White House
Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes of being untruthful in previous testimony con-
cerning Whitewater).
21. Douglas Jehl, 10 Clinton Aides Called in Inquiry on Arkansas S.&L.;
Nussbaum To Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at Al.
22. Michael Ruby, The Last White House Counsel?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 21, 1994, at 98.
23. The editorial argued that the President should consult either a private attor-
ney or the Justice Department when faced with legal questions, and the Office of
Governmental Ethics when faced with ethics questions. Id. Academics have argued
similarly in calling for the Counsel's power to be curtailed and for a reassertion of
the President's traditional legal adviser, the Justice Department's Office of Legal
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This Note explores the limits that the Constitution, particu-
larly under Article II and the separation of powers doctrine,
places on Congress's power to require the President to submit
White House advisers to the Senate for confirmation and to affix
conditions to his power to discharge those advisers. The first
section analyzes Congress's Article II power to pass laws estab-
lishing offices in the executive hierarchy.24 The next section
discusses the historical respect accorded to the President in the
selection of his own advisers and details the legislative history
behind the current law that "authorizes" the President to choose
his own staff. The third section examines the President's power
to remove advisers. The fourth section develops the theory that
the separation of powers doctrine bars Congress from requiring
Counsel (OLC), whose director is confirmed by the Senate. See, e.g., Nelson Lund,
Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 437, 488-89
n.127 (1993). No one has addressed the issue more frankly than Yale University's
Harold Koh, who in 1993 chastised two pro-OLC conference papers for their "under-
tone of self-congratulation." See Harold Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel
from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 513 (1993). He urged the current leadership at
the Justice Department to
take special pains to ensure that OLC does not come to play the same
role vis-a-vis the White House Counsel's Office that the State Department
has too often played with regard to the National Security Council in
recent administrations, namely, the President's legal counselor of second,
rather than first, resort.
Id. at 523. Koh's parallel between the OLC and the National Security Council is
striking, for it was fear of the NSA's growing authority that prompted Senator Ed-
ward Zorinsky in 1979 to amend an appropriations bill to require the Senate confir-
mation for the NSA and his deputy. NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at 129 (quoting
Senator Zorinsky as stating that the Senate must "[c]ome to grips with the fact that
there are two Secretaries of State within the Executive Branch").
24. Taxonomy is critical to this discussion. Core presidential advisers and assis-
tants are part of the WHO. The WHO includes the Chief of Staff, White House
Counsel, senior policy advisers, and assistants and deputy assistants to the Presi-
dent for legislative affairs, communications, management and administration, political
affairs, domestic and economic policy, and science and technology. The First Lady's
office also is part of the WHO, as is the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, who is also a member of the NSC. The WHO and the NSC are
part of a larger entity, the Executive Office of the President (EOP). See THE UNTrED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1993-94, supra note 14, at 91-94, 98. Among other
things, the WHO is distinguishable by its lump sum appropriation. See Treasury,
Postal, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 266
(1993) (statement of Patsy L. Thomasson, Special Assistant to the President) [here-
inafter Thomasson Statement].
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confirmation of many White House advisers. The final section
suggests a standard by which federal courts may judge whether
the legislative branch has gone too far in requiring confirmation
of an adviser. The Note concludes with a recommendation that
the President aggressively defend his office against proposals
that poach on his authority by vetoing bills that fail this
standard.
THE LANDSCAPE OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
Twenty years ago, a commentator noted that there was "no
discoverable federal statutory or judicial rule dealing with the
limits of congressional power to abolish and create offices,"'
and little has changed in two decades to clarify the proper divi-
sion of legislative and executive power. 6
Opposing Camps
Only a handful of legal scholars have examined Congress's
power to make a presidential adviser subject to Senate confirma-
tion. To date, only defenders of congressional power have ad-
vanced comprehensive arguments on the subject, 7 focusing on
the broad grants of legislative power contained in the Necessary
and Proper Clause" and the Appointments Clause.29
25. Richard A. Cirillo, Comment, Abolition of Federal Offices As an Infringement
on the President's Power To Remove Federal Executive Officers, 42 FORDHAM L. REV.
562, 586 (1974).
26. Some authorities treat the issue as settled. See HENRY J. MERRY, FIVE-
BRANCH GOVERNMENT 62 (1980) (stating that the Appointments Clause gives Con-
gress the power to "decide which offices shall exist and ... whether or not the
appointment of particular officers requires senatorial approval").
27. See, e.g., Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 98 (3d ed. 1993)
(claiming that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress "broad powers . . .
to place restrictions on the president's powers of removal, appointment, organization,
and reorganization").
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof").
29. Article II provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab-
1188
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According to this view, Congress may pass a law that "estab-
lishes" an office within the WHO or Executive Office of the Pres-
ident (EOP),0 prescribes its duties, and requires Senate confir-
mation for its director, deputy, or other senior positions.3 Law-
makers have passed such legislation a number of times, 2 often
drawing cries of legislative overreaching from their Capitol Hill
colleagues."3
If a particular office already exists, Congress potentially could
follow one of two paths. The first would be to pass a law de-
claring that the office holder must be appointed by the President
with the Senate's consent. The second option would be to abolish
the current office and reestablish it through legislation.34
In piecemeal fashion, proponents of executive authority have
argued that historic practice, 5 Article Irs grant of executive
lished by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id. art. IT, § 2, cl. 2.
30. See supra note 24.
31. RICHARD EHLKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL CREATION OF AN
OFFICE OF NATIONAL SEcuRITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT (1980), reprinted in NSA
Hearing, supra note 12, at 133.
32. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1023 established the Council of Economic Advisors
and provided that its members, including its chairperson, would be appointed by the
President with the Senate's consent. Other statutes creating executive offices or
entities with members subject to Senate confirmation include: 31 U.S.C. § 502 (1988)
(Office of Management and Budget); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4372 (1988) (Council on
Environmental Quality); id. § 6612 (Office of Science and Technology); and 50 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1988) (NSC).
33. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the Comm. on Government Op-
erations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970) (stating that Congress has a duty not to
interfere with the President's power over "the men close to him") (statement of Sen.
Abraham Ribicoff, chairman of the subcommittee).
34. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965, 5 U.S.C. app. 1516 (1994) (abol-
ishing all offices in the Bureau of Customs that were appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate).
35. See John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General:
A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 375, 399
(1993) (noting the Framers' belief that "the President would use his power of legal
interpretation to safeguard his own office").
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authority, 6 and the separation of powers principle37 restrain,
and at times forbid, congressional incursions into the "[e]xecu-
tive establishment."8 Policy considerations such as the Presi-
dent's need for discretion in operating his own staff so as to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"39 his implied
authority to discharge appointees,40 and his legal authority to
invoke executive privilege4' also play into the issue.
Buckley v. Valeo: Power To Create
A 1979 Congressional Research Service (CRS) paper support-
ing a bill that would have established the already existing NSA
post and subjected nominees to Senate confirmation claimed
that Congress had the authority to hook a member of the
President's staff into its confirmation orbit.4" The CRS based
its position on a 1976 Supreme Court ruling, Buckley v.
Valeo,4" which stated that Congress "may undoubtedly under
the Necessary and Proper Clause create 'offices' in the generic
sense and provide such method of appointment to those 'offices'
as it chooses.""
The CRS memo, however, read Buckley selectively. Congress's
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is "inevitably
bounded" by the Appointments Clause.45 Thus, those officials
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (stating that the "executive Power shall be vest-
ed in a President of the United States of America").
37. See OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 107.
38. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
40. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text.
41. Executive privilege refers to presidents' historic practice of resisting disclosure
of certain information to private parties and other branches of government. PETER
M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 162 (1988). The
Constitution does not specifically allow the President to withhold information from
Congress. However, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), that the President's interest in withholding information to protect confidenti-
ality with his advisers is implied: "[To the extent this interest relates to the effec-
tive discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based." Id. at 711.
42. EHLKE, supra note 31, at 133.
43. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 138 (finding that members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC),
who had not been appointed by the President and thus not appointed pursuant to
the Appointments Clause, could not exercise certain executive powers).
45. Id. at 139.
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exercising executive power-defined as the authority "to enforce
[the laws] or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such
enforcement"4S-must be "Officers of the United States," and
therefore must be appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate." Under Article II, Congress has the discretion to
vest the appointment of "inferior" officers in the President,
courts of law, or department heads. 8 The Court in Buckley,
however, said that the term "Officers of the United States" is
one "intended to have substantive meaning,"" prohibiting Con-
gress from upgrading a position to officer status unless the offi-
cer in that position exercises executive powers.
Objectively, White House advisers cannot be classified as
principal officers.50 They possess virtually no power outside
that which the President grants5' and cannot enforce laws or
appoint other law enforcers. 2 Presidents commonly reshuffle
46. Id. (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928)).
47. Id. Such officers often are distinguished as "[p]rincipal," id. at 132, or
"[sluperior" officers, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991). In practice,
the Supreme Court has allowed this distinction to slip at times. See United States
v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (stating that a vice-consul appointed by the
President to perform the duties of a principal officer for a limited time was not a
principal officer); Maijorie M. Whiteman, 7 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 3, at
33-35 (noting "personal rank" ambassadorial appointments, made by the President
without the Senate's advice and consent, may negotiate with foreign governments).
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Louis FISHER, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
241 (Stephen J. Wayne ed., 2d ed. 1995) (explaining that Article II grants Congress
the option of dispensing with advice and consent).
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26. The majority opinion made it clear that FEC
commissioners should not be designated inferior officers, as the Court spoke of the
FEC's "enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power to seek judicial re-
lief." Id. at 138.
50. The Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), reaffirmed a nineteenth
century standard that drew the line between an inferior and a principal officer
based on his or her "tenure, duration, emolument, and duties," id. at 672 (quoting
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879)).
51. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
52. Commentators have warned of the danger of presidential advisers placing
themselves between the President and his Cabinet. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 41,
at 22-23. Senior White House advisers, however, do not exercise the authority of
department heads, who may appoint inferior officers if so vested by Congress.
Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920). This is not to say presidential
counselors do not exercise significant authority. The White House's oversight of fed-
eral agencies' regulatory duties, particularly the activities of the now-defunct Council
on Competitiveness, attracted an enormous amount of attention. See, e.g., Michael
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responsibilities among officers; thus, individuals may wield pow-
er disproportionate to what their titles suggest.53 Appointees
"serve at the pleasure of the President,"54 and the chief execu-
tive should have unlimited discretion to discharge those who no
longer can serve as "an arm or an eye of the executive."55
Because Congress generally may require confirmation of infe-
rior officers," the inferior-principal distinction is not truly
meaningful from an executive power perspective. Indeed, the
distinction is relevant only if Congress classifies an adviser as a
principal officer. The Executive would then have a weaker argu-
ment for resisting legislative branch control. Lawmakers do not
always consider this distinction in drafting laws, perhaps believ-
ing they have the power to designate arbitrarily a federal official
as principal or inferior.57
As the next three sections demonstrate, however, legislative
discretion is limited. History, Supreme Court precedent curtail-
ing attempts to attach conditions to the President's power to dis-
charge appointees," and the separation of powers doctrine59
Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOzO L.
REv. 219, 249-50 (1993) (describing the "overlapping authority and influence" of the
Competitiveness Council, OMB, the White House Counsel, the Chief of Staff, and the
head of the Council of Economic Advisors in a "gruesomely messy" turf fight over a
proposed environmental regulation).
53. THE WHITE HOUSE: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 66-67 (R. Gordon Hoxie
ed., 1971) (noting that Ted Sorensen, who held the title of Special Counsel in the
Kennedy Administration, had "an informal portfolio known as 'the domestic policy
and program bag").
54. It is generally agreed that Congress may not impose restrictions on, or re-
move, executive officers who serve at the President's pleasure. Paul R. Verkuil, The
Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 794; see
infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text.
55. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935); see also
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 146-53
(1969) (describing James Madison's argument that only the President should have
removal power over his officers).
56. FISHER, supra note 48, at 241.
57. In 1974, when Congress passed legislation requiring Senate confirmation for
the OMB Director and Deputy Director, lawmakers said that they merely had taken
back power that they had vested in the President more than 50 years earlier. Mis-
souri Democrat John Melcher claimed that "hiaving decided in 1921 that the OMB's
predecessor was an inferior agency, [Congress] can reverse itself." OMB Hearings,
supra note 5, at 25.
58. See infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text.
59. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-76 (1988) (noting that "separation-of-
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combine to create an inviolable core of administrative control
over the White House staff.
HISTORIC RESPECT
White House advisers technically hold their jobs courtesy of
an obscure 1939 statute allowing the President to appoint "ad-
ministrative assistants" who "shall perform such duties as the
President may prescribe."6 ' The current system appears to be
constitutionally compatible with the statute: the President ap-
points his own staff by virtue of Congress's having "vest[ed]"
that power in him.61 The existence of this law implies that the
President's advisers and their assistants are inferior officers,
and, because the statute is silent with respect to White House
officials' tenure or the conditions under which they may be re-
moved, the President retains complete discretion to discharge
them.62 Such an interpretation, however, fails to protect the
President's autonomy to select his own staff. His authority is
under constant threat of erosion because what Congress may do,
it presumably may undo, either by divesting the President of his
authority to choose his key advisers without submitting their
names to the Senate for confirmation63 or by deciding that a
certain adviser has attained principal officer status.' As the
powers concerns . .. would arise if such provisions for appointment had the poten-
tial to impair the constitutional functions assigned to one of the branches"); infra
notes 123-59 and accompanying text.
60. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 301, 53 Stat. 561, 565 (current version
at 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1994)).
61. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879). The Court required of-
ficeholders to be appointed either as Officers-so-called "principal" officers--or inferi-
or officers under Article If. The Court later carved out exceptions to this one-or-the-
other rule, including postings for "expert" assistants. See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137
U.S. 310, 327 (1890); see also 3 U.S.C. § 105(c) (1994) (authorizing the President to
"procure" temporary experts and consultants).
62. See Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 398-401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
63. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) ("The constitutional author-
ity in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads of
departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such
laws as Congress may enact . . ").
64. See Chuck Alston, Bush Crusades on Many Fronts To Retake President's Turf,
CONG. Q., Feb. 3, 1990, at 295 (discussing the statement of House of Representatives
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next section demonstrates, Congress's historic hands-off treat-
ment of White House officials and lawmakers' goals in passing
the 1948 law imply a grant of complete presidential discretion
over a basic core of advisers.
Focus on Efficiency
The fight over presidential appointees-the question of which
branch of government controls their service-dates to the earli-
est days of our democracy.65 Before the Reorganization Act of
1939, no law "authorized" the President to select his own staff,
and the legislative history of the law confirms that Congress was
oblivious to the Article II gap that had existed for the previous
150 years.6 The purpose of the law was efficiency. The WHO,
as an entity, was not even mentioned in the law until a 1964
amendment." The 1939 version merely permitted the President
to appoint up to six "administrative assistants" at a maximum
salary of $10,000 per year.' Although the law stated that the
Counsel Steve Ross that "Congress can withdraw power it delegates").
65. See FISHER, supra note 27, at 88-90 (quoting George Washingtoen's assertion
that cabinet-level departments were agents of the President and James Madison's
warning that Congress must take "proper care ... to regulate and check the exer-
cise" of department heads).
66. The brief legislative history states that the law's purpose was to "codify and
enact into law the present provisions of law" relating to the President. S. REP. No.
1623, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2028. It
passed without debate.
67. Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-426, § 304(b), 78 Stat. 400, 422 (current
version at 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1994)).
68. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 301, 53 Stat. 561, 565 (current version
at 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1994)). The $10,000 salary cap suggests that Congress had
positions other than typists in mind, and it appears that Congress chose the number
six believing that Roosevelt had six close aides who served him in the White House.
See William C. Spragens, White House Staffs (1789-1974), in ORGANIZING AND STAF-
FING THE PRESIDENCY 7, 26 (Bradley D. Nash et al. eds., (1980)). However,
Spragens's contention that positions such as the White House press secretary became
"legislatively mandated," id., is questionable. The Reorganization Act does not men-
tion specific positions, and Roosevelt had more than six advisers in his free-wheeling
White House. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL
533-52 (1958). Furthermore, although a new version of the 1939 law, passed a few
years later, maintained the six assistant maximum, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, §
106, 62 Stat. 672, 678-79 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1) (1994)), President
Truman by that time was relying on the talents of more than a dozen close advi-
sers. Spragens, supra, at 28-29.
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assistants would "perform such duties as the President may pre-
scribe,"69 the 1937 report that recommended the statute con-
templated that the assistants would "have no power to make
decisions or issue instructions in their own right."70 The so-
called '"Brownlow Report," written by a presidential panel that
included congressmen, also stated that the new assistants
"would not be interposed between the President and the heads of
his departments.... They would remain in the background,
issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public state-
ments."7 The history of the act indicates that lawmakers did
not intend it to apply to presidential counselors such as Roose-
velt advisers Harry Hopkins or Samuel Rosenman, who was the
first White House legal adviser.72 "[INothing changed the fact
that presidential aides with special entree who were confidants
of the President would have great influence, whether or not they
held an official title."73
Rather, the driving forces behind subsequent amendments to
the 1939 law were primarily fiscal concerns, including
Congress's anxiety that executive branch salaries were lagging
behind the legislative and judicial branches and the private
sector. The Senate report that accompanied a 1964 amendment
noted:
Fair and reasonable pay throughout the Federal Govern-
ment is a matter of highest national importance. Since as-
suming office, President Johnson has vigorously supported
comprehensive pay legislation as the most effective step
which the Congress can take to assist him in his determined
drive for economy in Government.74
From 1939 to 1978, a period during which the White House
69. Reorganization Act § 301.
70. THE PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1937).
71. Id.
72. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Side: The Role of the White House
Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 63, 65-
66.
73. Spragens, supra note 68, at 26-27.
74. S. REP. NO. 1121, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2730, 2731.
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accrued power and notoriety,75 Congress amended the Reorga-
nization Act seven times but never with the intent to cabin the
President's power to select his personal staff.76 Today, presiden-
tial assistants give daily briefings,77 appear before Congress,7"
make personnel decisions,79 and promote policy actions.0 The
current function of the WHO undermines the theory that, fifty-
five years ago, Congress intended to assert its authority under
the Appointments Clause by vesting in the President the power
to appoint advisers.
Deference by First Congress
The tradition of respect for complete executive independence
in selecting key advisers has deep roots, as noted by Louis Fish-
er, an authority on the subject of shared powers and one of the
few academics to examine the issue presented in this Note. In a
CRS memo commenting on the bills to make the NSA subject to
Senate confirmation, Professor Fisher pointed out that the First
Congress intended that the President have autonomy in selec-
ting advisers.8' Representative John Lawrence, from New York,
for example, spoke for many of his colleagues in 1789 when he
objected to a bill providing compensation for President Washing-
ton because it contained an itemized budget.82 Lawrence elo-
75. EDWARD S. CORWiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 135
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
76. 3 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (noting previous amendments).
77. See, e.g., Ann Devroy, Clinton Says He'll Sign GOP Bill on Tax Breaks, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 1995, at Al, A13 (quoting White House Press Secretary Michael
McCurry during his daily briefing of reporters).
78. See, e.g., John McCaslin, Whitewater Twist, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1994, at A6
(referring to members of the White House Counsel's Office who testified before the
Senate Banking Committee on the Whitewater affair as the "White House 10").
79. See, e.g., Nancy E. Roman, White House Weighing Altman's Fate, Panetta Says,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at A4 (quoting White House Chief of Staff Leon E.
Panetta as considering ousting Treasury Secretary Roger Altman).
80. Linda Feldman, Clinton Faces Wrath of Left and Right on Racial Hiring,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 11, 1995, at 1, 8 (quoting William Galston, then the
President's deputy assistant for domestic policy, as promoting childhood immuniza-
tion, nutrition, and education programs).
81. See Louis FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMO: CONFIRMATION OF NATIONAL
SECUR TY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT (1979), reprinted in NSA Hearing, supra note
12, at 135.
82. See id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 633-34 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
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quently defended the need for a lump-sum appropriation: an
itemized list "will be improper, because it infringes [the
President's] right to employ a confidential person in the manage-
ment of those concerns, for which the Constitution has made
him responsible." 3 The WHO still enjoys such budgetary dis-
cretion," a fact noted by President Carter when he opposed the
NSA bill. 5
Although Professor Fisher acknowledges this historic support,
he maintains that a bill subjecting any presidential adviser to
Senate confirmation would be constitutional. He accords Con-
gress a virtual free hand in passing legislation to eliminate
executive branch offices-thereby effectively firing incum-
bents-and in setting conditions on appointments.86 Further-
more, he does not acknowledge any constitutional basis for argu-
ing that the President has the power to appoint close advisers
free from Senate advice and consent. Professor Fisher claims
that Congress has honored a tradition "favor[ing] a clean separa-
tion between Congress and the White House"87 only when pres-
idential advisers have kept their place: "[tihe 'autonomy' of the
White House Office depends very much on its own behavior.
Violations of trust, misapplication of funds, obstruction of legis-
83. Id.
84. See Thomasson Statement, supra note 24.
85. See Carter Letter, supra note 12, at 129-30. Unlike the OMB director, whose
post had been made subject to Senate confirmation in 1974, the NSA and his deputy
"are among the individuals paid from the Special White House Office Appropriation."
Id. at 130.
86. See Louis Fisher, The Allocation of Powers: The Framers' Intent, In SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 19, 28 (Barbara B. Knight ed.,
1989) (arguing that Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890), empowers Con-
gress to "remove an individual by abolishing the office" statutorily and to effectively
fire an executive officer by enacting a law reducing or eliminating his or her term);
see also FISHER, supra note 27, at 98 (asserting that the Necessary and Proper
Clause gives Congress "broad powers ... to place restrictions on the President's
powers of removal, appointment, organization, and reorganization"). Indeed, Professor
Fisher's only concession to the chief executive appears to be that Congress may not
designate a person to fill an office. See id. at 98; see also United States v. Ferreira,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51 (1852) (stating that only the President may appoint officers
of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate). Congress, however,
may appoint members to commissions or agencies whose powers are "essentially of
an investigative and informative nature." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976).
87. See FISHER, supra note 81, at 136.
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lative programs, and competition with departmental assign-
ments are some of the actions that encourage Congress to cir-
cumscribe White House operations, at times through the confir-
mation process. " "
In other words, it is a freebie thrown the President's way.
While Congress's interest in the activities in the West Wing and
the Old Executive Office Building rises and falls with such fac-
tors as those Professor Fisher lists, his views do not comport
with the historical record.89 Representative Lawrence's com-
ments before the First Congress demonstrate that the Framers
were not concerned about the President's personal staff.9" At
the time Article II was written and debated, their first priority
was the establishment of the future departments of the United
States government.9 Given Congress's traditional noninterfer-
ence in the President's power to choose his advisers, rigid pro-
Congress views92 misdraw the constitutional starting line by
severing the Appointments Clause from its critical history. The
President's authority in this area is a "systematic, unbroken,
executive practice" pursued with Congress's knowledge and thus
88. Id. at 138.
89. In dealing with separation of powers issues as they intersect with the Ap-
pointments Clause, the importance of history and the motivations of the Framers
cannot be overstated. Historical analysis undergirds, or at least influences, virtually
all cases and commentaries dealing with these constitutional subjects, regardless of
the writer's perspective concerning the weight to be given original intent. See Samu-
el W. Cooper, Considering "Power" in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361,
362 (1994).
90. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
91. See CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE & RICHARD M. PIous, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1984) ("The text indicates that the framers fully expect-
ed that the agencies of government would be established by legislation and that
their powers would be defined by law."). Congress created the first executive depart-
ments of State, Treasury, and War by statute. See id.
92. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88
NW. U. L. REv. 1346, 1346-47 (1994) (claiming that all executive branch officials
except the President and Vice President "occupy posts and exercise powers that owe
their existence to an act of Congress" and that Congress "can abolish the job of any
unelected official in the executive branch if it chooses"); cf Alan L. Feld, Separation
of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REV. 171, 175 (1986) ("[N]o
express provisions grant the President a zone of exclusive activity in which to con-
duct affairs of the executive branch without congressional interference."). Feld, how-
ever, acknowledges that the separation of powers principle requires that "each
branch [be able to] defend itself against subjugation by the other." Id. at 177.
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should be treated as a "gloss" on his executive power.9 The Re-
organization Act of 1939 should not be read as vesting in the
President the power to choose his own staff. The President did
not acquire that authority by virtue of congressional fiat; he
already possessed it at the time the law was enacted.
THE EXECUTIVE'S REMOVAL POWER
If there is any merit to the argument that the President has
total discretion to appoint members of his own staff, then that
power ought to include the authority to discharge advisers and
other White House staff members who cannot, or refuse to, fol-
low his directives.9 4 The current set-up, however, is awkward
given the legislature's power to attach conditions to the removal
of inferior officers, for example by requiring that the President
may only fire a particular official for "good cause."95
Evolution of Authority
Except for the provision granting Congress the power to im-
peach "civil Officers of the United States,"96 the Constitution
contains no reference to a power to remove government officials
from office. In Myers v. United States,7 the Supreme Court
held that Congress may legislate removal criteria only for infe-
rior officers.98 Chief Justice Taft, grounding his opinion in the
93. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
94. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) (finding that the Advice
and Consent Clause does not confer upon the Senate any right to interfere in the
removal of purely executive advisers); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316
(1903) (upholding the chief executive's power to go beyond statutory removal lan-
guage based on the "universal practice of the government for over a century"); see
also David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Execu-
tive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 309, 315 (1993) (quoting CHARLES C.
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 158-59 (1922), and
arguing that the President's power of removal was derived from the general execu-
tive power of administrative control).
95. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935); Myers, 272 U.S. at 160-64.
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
97. 272 U.S. 52.
98. Id. at 162.
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Article II grant of executive power and the Take Care Clause,99
found that the power to remove is a necessary adjunct to the
power of appointment.1"0 The Court granted the executive com-
plete latitude in firing members of his own staff, as long as
Congress retained its authority to confirm the nominee.'' Nine
years later, the Court confined its holding in Myers to "purely
executive officers"'0 ' and allowed Congress to fix the terms of or
limit the President's power to fire appointees whose nominations
were confirmed by the Senate, if the official exercised "quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial" power."3 The removal power thus
became conditioned on the "character of the office."0 4
More than a half century passed before the Court's latest revi-
sion. In Morrison v. Olson,105 the Justices threw out the execu-
tive/quasi-legislative framework"6 and held that the analysis
turned on a concern reminiscent of that in Myers: ensuring that
Congress, in attaching removal conditions, does not encroach on
either the President's exercise of "executive power"'0 ' or his
99. Id. at 163-64.
100. Id. at 119.
101. See id. at 163 (stating that, until Congress "is willing to vest [officers'] ap-
pointment in the head of the Department, they will be subject to removal by the
President alone"). The opinion does not state clearly whether a law vesting the au-
thority to appoint an officer in the President, as opposed to a department head,
would have allowed Congress to restrict removal, and Taft's conclusions have been
heavily criticized. See Edward S. Corwin, The President As Administrative Chief, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 72, 97-103 (Richard Loss ed., 1976).
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, felt that Myers still held lessons for
the modern era of interbranch power struggles. See Bernard Schwartz, An Adminis-
trative Law "Might Have Been"-Chief Justice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42
ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990) (quoting Burger as telling his colleagues that the
Court in Myers "said the power of removal was crucial to the Presidency").
102. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (describing a
purely executive officer as "one who [is] responsible to the President, and to him
alone").
103. Id. at 629.
104. Id. at 631.
105. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
106. See Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Re-
view at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 443 (1989) (noting
the Court's abandonment of the Humphrey's Executor test in favor of its current
"open formula").
107. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90. This nebulous provision of Article II may be
read as conferring broad and general powers on the President as chief executive. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc-
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"constitutionally designated duty to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. '""' 8 The test is whether a statutory limita-
tion on the President's authority to discharge a key White House
counselor-for example, for "good cause" only-leaves the execu-
tive branch "sufficient control... to ensure that the President is
able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.""9 Morri-
son is unequivocal that "some 'purely executive' officials...
must be removable by the President at will if he is to be able to
accomplish his constitutional role.""0 In Morrison, however,
the Court found that the good cause removal provision for the
Independent Counsel did not "unduly trammel[] on executive
authority" because the officer had limited jurisdiction and tenure
and had no "policymaking or significant administrative authori-
ty.""' Although this statement sounds like the job description
of an inferior officer,"' mere status as an inferior officer is not
the test for determining whether Congress may restrict presi-
dential control to discharge. Morrison's chief effect was to re-
quire a case-by-case review into the relationship between a par-
ticular adviser's function and presidential supervisory needs."3
The Court held that "there are no rigid categories of officials"
that Congress may protect from at-will employment status;"
tural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1165 (1992) (claiming that the President's executive power, "together with the Take
Care Clause . . . creat[es] a hierarchical, unified executive department"). According
to this view, the President's subordinates derive their power from the President, not
from statute, and thus "must perform their official functions under his supervision
and direction." Charles J. Cooper & Michael A. Carvin, The Price of "Political Inde-
pendence: The Unconstitutional Status of the Legal Services Corporation, 4 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 13, 24 (1994). Alternatively, the grant of executive power may "simply des-
ignate the president as the person who shall exercise whatever executive powers
Congress may choose to confer upon him." PYLE & PIOUS, supra note 91, at 49.
108. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-91 (holding that a "good cause" removal standard
for the Independent Counsel did not unduly trammel executive authority).
109. Id. at 696.
110. Id. at 690.
111. Id. at 691.
112. Id. at 670 (concluding that the Independent Counsel was an inferior officer).
113. Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 533, 538 (1989).
114. Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the
Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627, 645 (1989).
1996] 1201
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1183
the test is whether the "exercise of that discretion is so central
to the functioning of the Executive Branch" that the officer must
be terminable-at-will. 5
All the President's Personnel
A presidential adviser is an extension of the President him-
self. As Lee White, a former adviser to Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson remarked, "a White House staff man is only a reflector;
he is only a user of another man's power.., another man's
responsibility.""6 Advisers are devoted to the President's prob-
lems and often serve as a counterweight against the "parochi-
alism of experts and department heads.""7
These few assistants are the only other men in Washington
whose responsibilities both enable and require them to look,
as [the President] does, at the government as a whole....
[B]y working closely with departmental personnel, by spot-
ting, refining, and defining issues for the President, they can
increase governmental unity rather than splinter responsibil-
ity. A good White House staff can give a President that cru-
cial margin of time, analysis, and judgment that makes an
unmanageable problem more manageable.'
The President's manifest need to supervise the men and wom-
en who serve him should bar Congress from attaching removal
conditions to advisers who work in the White House Office,"'
regardless of whether they are classed as inferior officers. If
"performance depends on people," as President Gerald Ford's
chief of staff was fond of saying, 2 ' then courts should prohibit
Congress from legislatively assuming the role of superintendent
over White House personnel. Commentators who have examined
Humphrey's Executor and Morrison generally have agreed that
115. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92.
116. THE WHITE HOUSE: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS, supra note 53, at 71.
117. See Theodore C. Sorensen, Presidential Advisers, in THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVI-
SORY SYSTEM 3, 8 (Thomas E. Cronin & Sanford D. Greenberg eds., 1969).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 25.
120. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld's Rules, in THE PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION 33,
37 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1989).
1202
1996] CONFIRMATION OF WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS 1203
the President has "at-will control" over his advisers, 2' but
even supporters recognize that it remains an open question.'22
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Virtually all questions dealing with the federal appointments
process crystallize around separation of powers concerns. 2 '
The issue in Morrison was not Congress's power to declare an
appointee inferior or principal, which the Supreme Court has
never satisfactorily addressed," but whether the accoutre-
ments of the office created by the Ethics in Government Act
indicated into which category the Independent Counsel fell.'25
The Court then applied a separation of powers analysis to deter-
mine if the Attorney General's limited power to remove the
official "impede[d] the President's ability to perform his constitu-
tional duty."
26
121. See Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 291 n.107 (1993) (noting that the "traditional wisdom" is
that "the Constitution requires the President to have at-will control of his or her
cabinet").
122. Compare Verkuil, supra note 54, at 794 (stating that "nearly everyone would
agree that Congress cannot impose removal restrictions on some executive officials,
such as cabinet officers") with Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of
Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 338 (1989) (ac-
knowledging that "an argument remains that unfettered removal is not an automatic
incident of the President's power under article II").
123. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (noting that "the principle
of separation of powers is embedded in the Appointments Clause"); see also Note,
Congressional Power Under the Appointments Clause After Buckley v. Valeo, 75
MICH. L. REv. 627, 647-48 (1977) (arguing that Congress's power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to specify qualifications of officeholders is limited by separa-
tion of powers concerns).
124. Andrew Owen, Note, Toward a New Functional Methodology in Appointments
Clause Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 537 (1992) (arguing that the Court's
current test "invites an ad hoc and standardless classification by the judiciary of
various federal officials"); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (not-
ing that "the line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from
clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn").
125. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-73.
126. Id. at 691. The Court also stated that the Appointments Clause gives Con-
gress "significant discretion" to determine whether an executive official's appointment
should be vested outside the executive branch. Id. at 673. Because the Constitution
does not require the appointment of officers to be vested in the executive branch, see
id. at 674 (citing Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880)), Article II appears
to grant Congress the power to place the appointment of White House officials in a
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The Three-Layer Marble Cake
The separation of powers doctrine is not stated expressly in
the Constitution; rather, it is implied in the allocation of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial power under Articles I, II, and III of
the Constitution."7 This design was intentional. The principal
authors of The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton and James Madi-
son, believed power struggles among the branches would re-
strain each branch and protect citizens from governmental over-
reaching."
The origin of separation of powers is somewhat obscure,'29
and scholars disagree about the implied doctrine's utility13
department head outside the Executive Office of the President-such as a cabinet
member or a judicial official. This absurd possibility may give comfort to the posi-
tion that the President has no control over his core staff other than that which Con-
gress lends him, but it also validates the view that separation of powers shields the
chief executive from such mischief. See Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury
Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1973)
(testimony of Acting Attorney General Robert Bork that such reshuffling would "alter
the fundamental distribution of powers dictated by the Constitution"); Eric R.
Glitzenstein & Alan B. Morrison, The Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v.
Olson: A Common Sense Application of the Constitution to a Practical Problem, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 359, 366 (1989) (noting that Morrison requires that interbranch
appointments be scrutinized for separation of powers concerns).
127. Fisher, supra note 86, at 20-21.
128. Quint, supra note 106, at 428.
129. The subject of philosophical discussions in both the old and new worlds since
the early seventeenth century, the separation of powers principle appears in the
Maryland and Virginia declarations of rights, which were drafted before the Consti-
tution was adopted. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early
Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1989). Whereas
Montesquieu is the most frequently cited philosopher on the subject, the structure of
the national government "owes its existence to the experiences of the framers . . .
[who] used Montesquieu selectively . . . . The product was more theirs than his."
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLIcTs BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
7 (1991).
130. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15
CADOZO L. REV. 313, 313 (1993) (noting that the boundaries of government estab-
lished by the Constitution are few and that "the living must settle their own af-
fairs"); see also Charles M. Hardin, The Separation of Powers Needs Major Revision,
in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 90 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art
Kaufman eds., 1986) (arguing that the current implementation of separation of pow-
ers may threaten constitutional government). But cf Geoffrey P. Miller, From Com-
promise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 401, 402-03 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court's focus on separation of
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and the respect it should be accorded in enforcing constitutional-
ly allocated powers.'' The Supreme Court's approach to sepa-
ration issues has divided along two philosophically dissonant
lines-formalism and functionalism."32 Formalism "reasons log-
ically" from the fact that the first three Articles of the Consti-
tution define separate powers, as well as from the Framers' "ac-
knowledged purpose to create three independent branches with
distinct functions."133 Advancing this approach in 1935, the Su-
preme Court wrote, "[tlhe fundamental necessity of maintaining
each of the three general departments of government entirely
free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of
either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open
to serious question.""
Formalism often is criticized as rigid,135 yet President Nixon
adeptly invoked the doctrine's spirit in vetoing the 1973 bill3 6
powers increased dramatically from 1960 to 1989).
131. Compare Quint, supra note 106, at 430 ("The text of the Constitution ... is
particularly delphic about the distribution of powers between the President and Con-
gress.") with J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Supreme Court Enforcement of Separation of
Powers: A Balance Sheet, in SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM, supra note 86, at 83 ('The main structural limits on national authority
were the principles of enumerated and separated powers.").
132. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Pow-
ers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987). In the
modern era, Justice White was considered the foremost functionalist, see INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting), whereas Justice Scalia is
the Court's chief formalist, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Analysts have developed different paradigms, often analogous to the
formalist-functionalist breakdown, with which to analyze separation of powers issues.
See Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 108-
09 (1988) (arguing that the Court has followed "evolutionary" and -de-evolutionary"
traditions in its separation of powers jurisprudence); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 52-58 (contrasting "pragmatic" and "neoclassical"
approaches to separation of powers analysis).
133. Bruff, supra note 113, at 536. For a less flattering description, see E. Donald
Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 506, 518 (1989) (describing the Court's formalist approach in Chadha as the
sort of "rigid, sanctimonious attitude typical of priesthoods . . . when they have lost
touch with the substance of their religion").
134. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
135. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 494 (1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court's formalist analysis in
Chadha and Bowsher as "far too mechanical").
136. Nixon later signed a nearly identical bill that applied only to future nominees
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that would have required the OMB Director and Deputy Direc-
tor to be confirmed by the Senate: "The responsible. exercise of
the separate legislative and executive powers is a demonstration
of the workability of the American system.... [I]f it is to re-
main workable, I must continue to insist on a strong delineation
of power and authority... .""' Nixon's Justice Department,
while acknowledging that the Constitution does not envision
"total separation between the branches," argued that failure to
afford the President exclusive control over his immediate ad-
visers would "thwart" the separation of powers system and
move the United States "a long way toward a parliamentary
system."
138
Functionalism seeks to preserve a "reasonable balance" among
the three branches, given the realities of overlapping authority
inherent in the modern governmental organism."9 The ap-
proach draws energy from contemporary history, in particular
the abuses by the executive branch during the Watergate
era, 140 and recognizes that, "if the strength of one branch has
for Director and Deputy Director. Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, § 1, 88
Stat. 11, 11 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b) (1988)). This result corrected the
Nixon Administration's concern that the bill not be "a backdoor method of circum-
venting the President's power to remove." Nixon Veto Message, supra note 6, at 681.
The law, however, did not address the White House's and Republican lawmakers'
primary constitutional objections, which were grounded in the separation of powers
principle. See OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 7 (statement by Rep. Frank Horton
that separation of powers and "orderly relations" between the two branches are good
reasons to allow the President to have a personal staff that does not have to stand
for Senate confirmation).
137. Nixon Veto Message, supra note 6, at 681.
138. OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 107.
139. Quint, supra note 106, at 444.
140. The dispute between President Nixon and Congress over the OMB bill should
not be overshadowed by Nixon's well-documented overstepping of executive authority
and Congress's subsequent reassertion of power vis-h-vis the executive branch. See
Miller, supra note 130, at 409-10. While this may have been the larger context in
which the confrontation over presidential advisers arose, the legal arguments put
forward by the President and his lawyers were pragmatic and balanced compared,
for example, with the Nixon Administration's rigid view regarding executive privi-
lege. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 341 (D.D.C. 1976)
(noting the Nixon Justice Department's argument that Congress could not require
the Administrator of General Services to take possession of the President's tapes
because the three branches of government are "totally distinct and autonomous,
and . . . the separation of powers doctrine bars actions by one branch that even
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become clearly overpowering in reality, innovative countermea-
sures might be permissible to redress the balance.""
Many commentators lament that the Supreme Court has
refused to embrace a particular mode of analysis or delineate
clearly the circumstances that merit using one approach over the
other.' Two 1986 decisions," which were released the same
day, suggest that the Court will use a formalistic analysis when
the constitutional actors are in direct confrontation'" but will
use a functional approach when two branches clash indirect-
ly-for example, over the duties assigned to administrative
agencies. 4
Focus on Congressional Motivations
Legislative impositions on executive power are far more likely
to pass constitutional muster if Congress works its will through
an executive or independent agency, as opposed to a legislative
scheme that results in the "encroachment or aggrandizement" of
congressional power at the expense of the executive. 4 6 The lat-
ter situation would include either a law requiring confirmation
of presidential advisers or a law accomplishing the same objec-
tive by abolishing, then recreating, an office. The Court might
indirectly impinge upon another"), affd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
141. Quint, supra note 106, at 444.
142. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 133, at 507 ("The Court has reached a collection
of results in separation of powers cases-some sensible and pragmatic, others utterly
asinine."); Strauss, supra note 132, at 489.
143. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (holding
that the separation of powers doctrine was not violated by statute giving indepen-
dent regulatory agency power to hear state law counterclaims in reparation proceed-
ings); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that the separation of powers
doctrine was violated by assignment of executive powers to the Comptroller General
under the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Control Act because Congress retained removal
authority over the officer).
144. See Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 643; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d
476, 524 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Where one branch appropriates the
functions of another . . . a straightforward, 'formalistic' analysis is indeed the order
of the day."), rev'd sub non. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
145. See Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 643 (noting that the Court's separation of
powers analysis becomes less rigid when an agency is involved); see also Schor, 478
U.S. at 855 (maintaining that Congress may create a "quasi-judicial mechanism" in
an administrative agency without violating separation of powers principles).
146. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
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view such a direct confrontation between Congress and the Pres-
ident as the sort of "zero-sum game" that would demand a for-
malistic analysis. "7
An intrusion into the President's historic prerogative to choose
and exercise control over his advisers likely would fail a func-
tionalist analysis as well. The Court in Morrison stated that the
test is whether the law "impermissibly undermine[s]" the
President's powers, 48 a standard borrowed from Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.49 When Morrison was
decided at the appellate level, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
voted to uphold the Independent Counsel law, a position at odds
with the majority of her colleagues on the D.C. Circuit, but one
with which the Supreme Court agreed on review.150  In
concluding that the statute did not violate separation of pow-
ers, 5' Judge Ginsburg carefully applied three factors laid out
in Schor: (1) the extent of removal (or "siphoning off"'52) of ex-
ecutive power from the President, (2) whether the limitation af-
fects a "core executive function," and (3) the purpose of the
legislation.'53
The first of the Schor factors tips in favor of presidential au-
tonomy in selecting his own advisers and staff. Assuming no
congressional aggrandizement (in which case the Supreme Court
would apply a stricter formalist approach'54 ), a federal law re-
quiring the President to submit for confirmation White House
advisers would drain his authority by giving Congress the power
to check a central-indeed, personal-exercise of executive pow-
er. With respect to the second element, Judge Ginsburg ex-
plained that the President's "core" functions are his enumerated
147. See Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 643.
148. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 856).
149. 478 U.S. 833 (upholding a congressional delegation of judicial power to an in-
dependent agency).
150. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 528 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 524.
153. Id. at 525.
154. Id. at 524. The Court probably would not find aggrandizement in such a case
because the legislative branch would appear to be exercising its constitutional pow-
ers under the Appointments Clause.
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powers,155 suggesting that congressional interference does not
violate separation of powers because Article II does not list au-
thority over staff among the President's powers and, in fact,
provides that Congress will share the appointment responsibili-
ty. Judge Ginsburg also stated, however, that the question of
whether the power is a "core" function depends on whether "the
job must be kept, in any and all cases, under the President's
wing and cover,"56 a phrase that eloquently describes the posi-
tion of White House advisers. 57
Resolution of the issue posed in this Note under a function-
alist analysis would seem to turn on whether Congress, in pass-
ing a law that requires Senate confirmation for a presidential
adviser or future adviser, has a legitimate purpose in mind, or
whether Congress is motivated by a desire to dilute presidential
control. This question is exactly what state courts have consis-
tently asked in ruling on the legitimacy of state assemblies' at-
tempts to curtail governors' authority over their staffs." 8 The
state court standard, discussed in the next section, supplements
the Supreme Court's functionalist standard; it is specific to legis-
lative attempts to make executive advisers subject to advice and
consent, an issue not squarely addressed in any Supreme Court
opinion."'
155. Id. at 526; see also Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspec-
tive on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989) (stating that
the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to permit governmental actors to
share power in any fashion so long as the scheme "does not interfere with the per-
formance of its 'core functions' by one of the named actors").
156. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 526.
157. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
159. The closest the Supreme Court came to addressing this issue was in United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), in which three executive branch employees
challenged an act of Congress that cut off their pay due to a finding by a House
committee that they were "guilty" of engaging in subversive activities, id. at 311-12.
The law would have allowed the plaintiffs to be compensated if the President reap-
pointed them with the Senate's advice and consent. The Court held the law uncon-
stitutional as a bill of attainder and took no position on the petitioners' separation
of powers claim. Id. at 315-18. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter suggest-
ed that the employees' de facto removal from office-the cutting off of their sala-
ries-raised a "serious" question about the "constitutional distribution of power over
removal" between the executive and legislative branches. Id. at 327-28 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); see also Brief for Petitioner at 30, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
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STANDARDS FOR LEGISLATIVE TINKERING
Congress treads on less-than-solid ground when it attempts to
"create" an office that already exists, either by abolishing and
then recreating it, or by enacting a statutory overlay on the
present position. 6 ' In 1974, the Nixon Justice Department
found itself opposing two challenges to the President's power to
select his key advisers: a bill to require that the OMB Director
and Deputy be confirmed by the Senate, including a limit on
their terms to four years, 6' and a substitute measure that
would have abolished the positions, then reestablished them
subject to the requirement of Senate confirmation.'62
Relying entirely on state court rulings striking down similar
laws passed by state legislatures, the Justice Department con-
ceded that a legislature would be acting lawfully if it completely
abolished an executive office or if it abolished an existing post,
then recreated in its place a substitute office with "substan-
tially new, different, or additional functions."' The Justice
Department's analysis concluded, however, that "when the func-
tions and powers of the new office are substantially identical
with those of the office which has been abolished, it will be im-
plied that the purpose 'was to abolish the officer and not the of-
fice.""' A "merely colorable" abolition of an office is an in-
fringement on an executive's control over his or her staff.'65
A CRS analysis, which supported the 1979 bill to recreate the
303 (1946) (Nos. 809, 810, 811) (maintaining that Humphrey's Executor "nowhere
suggests that any officer . . . may be directly removed by Congress itself').
160. See NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at 135 n.19.
161. H.R. 3932, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in OMB Hearings, supra note
5, at 5.
162. See OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 22.
163. Id. at 110.
164. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Hammond v. Maxfield, 132 P.2d 660, 664 (Utah
1942)).
165. Hammond, 132 P.2d at 664 (holding that whether legislation removing an in-
cumbent is a "bona fide reorganization" depends on "good faith"); see also Hunziker
v. Kent, 168 A. 825, 826 (N.J. 1933) ("The abolition of an office or position
must . . . be bona fide."); Smith v. Sells, 3 S.W.2d 660, 660 (Tenn. 1928) (defining
"colorable" as a change in which the differences between the old and new offices
"are confined to mere matters of detail" and do not alter "the nature or identity of
the office").
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NSA's position,166 arrived at a similar conclusion: "[It is ques-
tionable whether Congress" may pass a law "solely as a means
to remove a particular incumbent," but it may remove an incum-
bent if it acts with a "legitimate organizational purpose," such as
efficiency. 6 '
Both appraisals are compelling support for a protected core of
White House officials shielded from congressional confirmation
grabs, especially because the analysts represent opposing sides
of the debate. Many of the same state court rulings relied on by
Nixon's Justice Department appear in support of the CRS's con-
clusion. 8' These opinions, from Pennsylvania, 169  Utah,
70
and New York,' 71 examined state laws that terminated execu-
tive posts-so-called "ripper bills"' 7 --and concluded that a
legislative body must act "pursuant to a valid reorganization
plan or other legislative purpose and must operate to abolish
completely and perpetually the office involved." 3 If the office's
"powers, duties and functions ... remain in existence in a sin-
gle office under the same or a different name, it would be im-
possible to claim abolition." 4 The ripper bill thus would be
unconstitutional.
Given the harmony of the state court approach with Schor's
focus on the concerns that lead Congress to act, federal courts
using a functionalist separation of powers approach should apply
166. See supra notes 11-12, 23 and accompanying text.
167. EHLKE, supra note 31, at 134.
168. See NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at 134 n.16.
169. Suermann v. Hadley, 193 A. 645 (Pa. 1937); Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v.
Clark, 193 A. 634 (Pa. 1937).
170. State ex rel. Hammond v. Maxfield, 132 P.2d 660 (Utah 1942).
171. O'Connor v. Greene, 21 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
172. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POSITION ON PROPOSED SUBSTITUTE OF CON-
GRESSMAN BROOKS FOR H.R. 3932 AND S. 518 (1973), in OMB Hearings, supra note
5, at 109.
173. Cirillo, supra note 25, at 593 (cited in NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at 134)
(emphasis added); see cases cited supra note 165.
174. See Cirillo, supra note 25, at 593 (cited in NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at
134). One exception would be if an office has no incumbent officer at the time the
act becomes effective. In this case, Cirillo suggests that any question of violation of
executive power would be moot because no constitutional issues dealing with removal
could be raised. See id. at 593 n.197. This, however, does not preclude a separation
of powers argument based on an issue other than removal. See supra notes 146-59
and accompanying text.
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a "merely colorable" standard-requiring a valid purpose for the
action-and strike down attempts to require confirmation of
appointees to newly created offices unless the new office's au-
thority is substantially different from that of the old office. Such
a standard would prevent legislative intrusions into the
President's personal staff while preserving for the legislative
branch a tool to curb overreaching executive branch officers by
allowing the legislative branch to abolish offices it has already
created.'75 Under the current system, no presidential adviser
in the WHO76 could be touched because these advisers' posi-
tions are not statutorily created, with the exceptions of the As-
sistant to the President for Science and Technology' and the
Director of the White House Office on Environmental Policy.7 '
Within the EOP, of which the WHO is a part,'79 most of the
advisers are the heads of statutorily created departments and
must be confirmed by the Senate. The NSA and the United
States Trade Representative are exceptions.' s Congress may
not pass a law requiring advice and consent for an EOP adviser
who is appointed solely by the President or a law abolishing,
then recreating, the same position, unless Congress acts pursu-
ant to a valid organizational purpose and either abolishes the
old office or replaces it with a new office with substantially al-
tered jurisdiction or authority.
Such a requirement would force lawmakers to consider their
actions more carefully, compelling them to consider whether it is
better to do without a particular office or to allow the President
to have absolute authority over the appointee in that office.
175. The President, of course, is free to consult with whomever he wishes and
could recreate any advisory position abolished by statute. As former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk noted, the President "is entitled to seek and get advice from any
source whatever, including his chauffeur." Letter from Dean Rusk to Senator Frank
Church, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Mar. 28, 1980), reprinted in
NSA Hearing, supra note 12, at 140.
176. See THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1993-94, supra note 14, at 93-
94.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 6612 (1988).
178. Id. § 4372(a).
179. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1993-94, supra note 14, at 91-106.
180. See id. at 100. The United States Trade Representative was created by execu-
tive order and reorganized by an act of Congress, but the position is not subject to
senatorial confirmation. Id.
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Public scrutiny would increase because Congress would be
barred from "circumvent[ing] by indirection" the President's
power to select and control his advisers. 8' The workability of
this model may be demonstrated by applying the standard to the
two most prominent attempts to subject presidential advisers to
senatorial advice and consent-the successful OMB law and the
bills introduced in 1979 and 1980 dealing with the NSA.
The successful attempt to extend the Senate's advice and
consent role to the OMB Director and Deputy Director was a
legitimate exercise of Congress's authority. The bills introduced
in 1973 were animated by a concern that OMB had been taking
on increasingly nonadvisory functions and coincided with Capitol
Hill leaders' frustration over the Nixon Administration's prac-
tices of impounding funds, zero budgeting, and engaging in "far-
reaching" reorganizations of the executive branch without con-
gressional approval.'82 President Nixon used OMB to cut the
traditional lines of communication between department heads
and their agents in the field, thus thwarting congressional in-
tent.1" As one former Kennedy Administration counselor
warned, the White House staff must not "replace the role of a
Cabinet official or block his access to the President."" Indeed,
this was the command issued by President Roosevelt when for-
mally creating the WHO in 1939."'5
181. See OMB Hearings, supra note 5, at 110 (quoting State ex rel. Hammond v.
Maxfield, 132 P.2d 660, 664 (Utah 1942)).
182. See id. at 1. Chairman Chet Holifield stated that the President had "precipi-
tated what many believe is a constitutional crisis in this country." Id. Similar criti-
cisms have been levelled at the former Reagan Administration. See, e.g., LOUIS FISH-
ER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 (1992) (de-
scribing the efforts by political appointees at the Justice Department, the White
House, and OMB to establish a "unitary executive" in which the President would
enjoy "total control over all executive agencies").
183. See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITCS, POSITION, AND POWER 111 (4th ed. 1986).
184. Sorensen, supra note 117, at 8.
185. See Exec. Order No. 8248, 4 Fed. Reg. 3864 (1939) ("In no event shall the
Administrative Assistants be interposed between the President and the head of any
department or agency . . . ."). In the modern era, however, Cabinet officials' power
has "declined precipitately," and apparently irreversibly, as the presidential office has
experienced a corresponding expansion in size and authority. See CORWIN, supra note
75, at 135; see also Margaret J. Wyszomirski, The Waning Capital of Cabinet Ap-
pointments, in THE PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION, supra note 120, at 147, 155 (arguing
that the White House staff has become the "locus of political skills capital rather
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In contrast, the proposals by Senator Edward Zorinsky to
"create" the post of NSA and Deputy NSA were motivated by the
Senator's desire to control an adviser whose influence in foreign
policy deliberations had increased, due in part to Zbignew
Brzezinski's access to the President.' President Carter suc-
cessfully opposed this intrusion into his executive authority.5 7
The "merely colorable" test might have been satisfied had Sena-
tor Zorinsky's bill been introduced during the latter days of the
Reagan Administration, when the NSC was at the center of
extraordinary efforts by the White House to evade the law in its
arms-for-hostages deal with Iran. 8' News reports do not indi-
than the cabinet").
186. See John M. Goshko, Senate Voice Sought on Brzezinski's Successors, WASH.
POST, May 11, 1979, at A2; see also Thomas M. Franck, Comment, The Constitu-
tional and Legal Position of the National Security Adviser and Deputy Adviser, 74
AMER. J. INT'L L. 634, 636 (supporting the Zorinky proposal as a means to "psycho-
logically condition the nominee" to be more receptive to congressional oversight and
claiming that a nominee 'could even be required to pledge, in writing, compliance
with specific congressional policies").
187. 125 CONG. REC. 22,311 (1979) (statement of Sen. Church explaining that the
President felt the NSA "was so important to him and was regarded as so much a
part of the President's staff that he would either veto the bill or insist on a recipro-
cal right to pass judgment on the chiefs of staff of the two respective committees").
The amendment was deleted in conference. Id.
188. See 100-7 Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the
House Select Comm. To Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 180 (1987) (statement of former NSC staff member Oliver L. North) ("I
participated in preparation of documents for the Congress that were erroneous, mis-
leading, evasive and wrong, and I did it again here when I appeared before that
committee convened in the White House situation room . . . ."); 100-8 id. at 152
(statement by former NSA John Poindexter) ("[Tihe Boland Amendment [does] not
apply to the NSC staff."). See generally LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE
FINAL REPORT 105, 112-22 (1994) (detailing the evidence that supported a 12-count
indictment against Oliver North). After Iran-Contra was exposed, Democratic leaders
revived the idea of making the NSA subject to Senate confirmation. See Sara Fritz,
Congress Members Predict Move To Curb President's Secret Diplomacy, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1986, at 9. However, the President would have no obligation to appoint a
security adviser under such a law and could fill the post "with a minor figure and
rely on a predominant foreign-policy adviser installed by his own free choice in the
White House." Philip Geyelin, Only the President Can Fix It, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
1986, at D8. Interestingly, Harold Koh, who has suggested a string of reforms in the
wake of Iran-Contra, never proposed requiring senatorial confirmation for the NSA
or Deputy NSA. See HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 161-
207 (1990).
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cate exactly what Republican lawmakers intend to accomplish
with their most recent bill.'89 If their efforts are due only to a
disagreement over the Clinton Administration's foreign policy,
then the bill will not have a valid legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION
Protecting the President's "inner circle" does not require feder-
al courts to ignore the Appointments Clause and its command
that the task of appointing members of government be shared by
the President and Congress. The modern practice follows a tech-
nically constitutional scheme in which Congress "grants" the
President authority to appoint his own advisers. This arrange-
ment, however, mocks the design of the Framers because Article
II, read without reference to history or the separation of powers
doctrine, appears to permit Congress to revoke the President's
vesting power and demand that the appointment of a personal
adviser be confirmed by the Senate. Furthermore, on its face,
the Appointments Clause does not appear to bar a statute "cre-
ating" an existing executive post subject to the Senate's advice
and consent authority or to prevent Congress from limiting the
President's power to discharge White House officials.
All of these scenarios would strip the President of control over
the eyes and ears of his executive organization. This Note ar-
gues that such legislative overreaching would buck an estab-
lished historical record of complete presidential autonomy in
choosing advisers and would be contrary to the separation of
powers principle, as clarified by recent Supreme Court rulings.
Separation of powers independently bars the legislative branch
from venturing too deeply into the presidential woods when
attempting, either directly or by circuitous routes, to pass laws
requiring senatorial confirmation for White House counselors.
The doctrine forbids actions that merely dress up old advisers in
new uniforms.
This Note also urges a workable standard drawn from state
courts: to be constitutionally sound, such laws must be designed
to improve organization or efficiency of an office and must com-
189. See McCaslin, supra note 17, at A5.
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pletely abolish the old office in question. If a court determines
that a new office is not substantially different from the old of-
fice, it should strike down the statute as a mere colorable aboli-
tion. This test is consistent with the Supreme Court's approach
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, which
focused on the President's performance of his core duties and
scrutinized legislative motives. 90 At least one member of the
Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, can be expected to argue
for scrutinizing congressional motives in ruling on the constitu-
tionality of such laws.'9 '
The President, of course, has the power to veto bills that
would limit his control over the White House staff. Should it
become necessary, the chief executive should not hesitate to
forcefully defend his office's historic prerogatives and should
explain his actions with reference to history and the separation
of powers doctrine. If Congress acts with an authentic mo-
tive-one aimed at improving efficiency or curbing abuses of
executive power by presidential appointees-then courts should
allow the Senate to exercise its advice and consent role; but, if
mere anxiety over executive branch officials' influence or policies
undergirds such proposals, those laws that survive the veto pen
should be struck down as unconstitutional.
Douglas S. Onley
190. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
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